This was due to the zeal of NATO countries to improve Egypt`s troubled economy, the belief that Egypt should begin to focus more on its own interests than on those of the Arab world, and the hope that an agreement with Israel would catalyze similar agreements between Israel and its other Arab neighbours and help solve the Palestinian problem. Prime Minister Begin`s reaction to Sadat`s initiative, even if sadat or Carter had not hoped, showed a willingness to engage the Egyptian head of state. Like Sadat, Begin saw many reasons why bilateral discussions would be in his country`s best interest. It would give Israel the opportunity to negotiate only with Egypt, rather than with a larger Arab delegation that might try to use its size to make unwelcome or unacceptable demands. Israel believed that Egypt could help protect Israel from other Arabs and eastern communists. Moreover, the opening of direct negotiations between the heads of state and government – the diplomacy of the summit – would distinguish Egypt from its Arab neighbours. Carter`s people apparently had no idea of the secret talks in Morocco between Dayan and Sadat`s representative, Hassan Tuhami, which paved the way for Sadat`s initiative. In fact, Egypt and Israel somehow piled up to drive Carter out of his footsteps in Geneva. The basic message of Sadat`s speech to the Knesset was the call for the implementation of resolutions 242 and 338. Sadats` visit was the first step towards negotiations such as the Cairo Preliminary Conference in December 1977. [citation needed] In his book The Oslo Syndrome, professor of psychiatry at Harvard Medical School and historian[36] Kenneth Levin summarizes the failure of Camp David Summit 2000: “Despite the size of the Israeli supply and the strong pressures of President Clinton, Arafat was discouraged. Indeed, it seems that it was not prepared to sign, independently of Israeli concessions, an agreement which declared itself final and which made other Palestinian demands. [30] Levin asserts that both Israelis and Americans were naïve if they expected Arafat to agree to abandon the idea of a “right of return” for all Palestinians in Israel, regardless of the number of refugees in 1948 or the amount of monetary compensation Israel wanted to grant. Two other important lessons are less tangible.
Camp David needed a remarkable guided tour of Sadat, Begin and Carter. Sadat took enormous political risks – which ended up costing him his life – by negotiating with Israel.